Three experiments with rats investigated how the associative strengths of the representations that underlie conditional learning change when they are conditioned in compound. The results of each experiment suggest that the representation whose associative strength is most discrepant from the asymptote supported by the outcome of the trial undergoes the greatest change in associative strength. These results parallel those from simple Pavlovian conditioning (e.g., R. A. Rescorla, 2000) , are inconsistent with unique-cue and configural accounts of conditional learning, and support a connectionist analysis of learning in which a "winner-takes-all" rule applies to the hidden units that can be activated and acquire associative strength at a given point in time.
The results of a recent series of ingenious experiments suggest that changes in associative strength follow a negatively accelerated function (e.g., Rescorla, 2001) . In one such experiment, hungry rats first received Pavlovian conditioning trials in which two stimuli (A and C) were followed by food and two further stimuli (B and D) were not. Rats then received a second period of training in which A and B were presented individually and paired with food (Experiment 1, Rescorla, 2001) . In the critical test, rats received two test compounds, AD and BC. The logic behind the use of this procedure is that each test compound contains one stimulus that was originally paired with food and one that was not, and consequently any difference in responding between the two must reflect differences in what was learned when A and B were paired with food during the second period of training. The rationale for its use is simple too: It allows changes in the associative strength of two stimuli with widely differing initial tendencies to elicit responding (i.e., A and B) to be tested at similar performance levels (with D and C, respectively) . During the test, responding was greater during BC than AD and, accepting the logic and rationale outlined above, this observation indicates that the change in associative strength during conditioning trials with A and B was greater for the stimulus that began these trials with the least excitatory associative strength (i.e., B).
As Rescorla (2001) noted, although the results outlined in the previous paragraph are predicted by many models of associative learning (e.g., Pearce, 1994; , those of other, related experiments are inconsistent with such models. For example, Rescorla (2000) reported one experiment in which rats received similar training to that outlined above with the notable exception that during the second period of training A and B were presented as the components of a compound that was paired with food. Under these conditions, models for which the change in the associative strength of a given stimulus (e.g., A or B) is driven by the difference between (a) the maximum level of associative strength supportable by the outcome of the trial (in this case food) and (b) the combined associative strengths of all stimuli presented on that trial (in this case A and B) predict that A and B should undergo equivalent changes in associative strength (see, e.g., Pearce, 1994; . However, during the test stage, rats again responded more during BC than AD. This is a theoretically challenging finding: It supports the view that during compound conditioning (with AB in the case under consideration) the component (B) whose associative strength differs most from the asymptote supported by the outcome of the trial (food) undergoes the greatest change in associative strength. The present experiments sought to explore the generality of this view. In particular, they examined whether it holds when the associative changes under consideration involve the representations acquired during conditional learning procedures. Our interest in this issue derives from our recent studies that have examined the associative structures acquired during conditional learning.
In a typical study from our laboratory, rats might be placed in Contexts A and B and receive presentations of one stimulus, X, that are paired with food and presentations of another stimulus, Y, that are not, and also be placed on other trials in two further contexts, C and D, in which Y is paired with food and X is not. Rats given such training approach the site of food delivery when X is presented in Contexts A and B and when Y is presented in Contexts C and D, but are less likely to do so when X and Y are presented in the alternative contexts. A number of supplementary findings suggest that the acquisition of such discriminations is best captured by a three-layer connectionist network in which patterns of sensory input affect activity in output units for food and no food via connections to and from a layer of hidden units (see Honey, 2000) . For example, following the acquisition of the discrimination described above, pairing Context A with food and Context C with no food results in Context B eliciting greater conditioned responding than Context D (see Ward-Robinson & Honey, 2000;  see also Coutureau et al., 2002; Hodder, George, Killcross, & Honey, 2003; Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2001 Honey & Watt, 1998 , 1999 . This observation is inconsistent with networks of the form developed by Pearce (1994) and Wagner and Rescorla (1972;  see also Brandon, Vogel, & Wagner, 2000) in which configural units and unique cues, respectively, code for conjunctions of stimuli that have actually been presented (e.g., A and X or B and X, but not A and B). Instead they provide support for the suggestion that a common hidden unit comes to be activated by Contexts A and B, and this unit can mediate generalization between them. In particular, we have assumed that pairing A with food results in an increase in the strength of the links between the hidden unit activated by A (and B) and the food output unit, and it is this change that allows B to elicit more responding than D during the final test. That is, like many others who have adopted a connectionist framework, we have simply assumed that associatively activated units in the hidden layer can undergo associative change, without presenting any direct evidence that this is the case let alone examining whether any such associative changes are similar in form to those observed in simple Pavlovian conditioning. To these ends, Experiments 1-3 used experimental designs that are conceptually similar to those developed by Rescorla (2000) to examine the nature of the associative changes that occur when the representations that underlie conditional learning are conditioned in compound. As the results unfold, it will become clear that they have important implications for our understanding of the associative structures that underlie conditional learning and the rules that govern changes in associative strength within these structures. It will also become evident that the specific account that our results support can be viewed as an associative analysis of what might otherwise be described as "attentional" processes.
Experiment 1
The design of Experiment 1 is summarized in the upper part of Table 1. In the first stage, all rats received two training sessions on each day. In one session, they were placed in Context A (an operant chamber with, for example, checked wallpaper and a standard grid floor) and received presentations of Stimulus X (e.g., a tone) that were paired with food (AX 3 food) and presentations of Stimulus Y (e.g., a light) that were not (AY 3 no food). In the other session, the rats were placed in another context, C (an operant chamber with, for example, a warm floor and standard aluminum walls), in which presentations of Y were paired with food (CY3 food) and those of X were not (CX 3 no food). To acquire this contextual conditional discrimination, rats clearly need some way of representing the fact that some combinations of the stimuli are followed by food (i.e., AX and CY) and others are not (i.e., AY and CX). The lower part of Table 1 illustrates one way in which this could be achieved and uses ax and cy to denote representations of the combinations associated with food (AX and CY, respectively) and ay and cx to denote representations of the combinations associated with no food (AY and CX, respectively) . For the present purposes, ax, ay, cx, and cy can be considered unique cues (e.g., , configural representations (Pearce, 1994) , or hidden units within a connectionist network (see, e.g., ; but, as we show later, these alternatives can be discriminated from one another (see Experiments 2 and 3). Returning to the design of Experiment 1, in the second, revaluation stage, rats were placed in Context A (the operant chamber with checked walls) and received compound presentations of XY (i.e., a simultaneous compound comprising the tone and light) that were paired with food (AXY 3 food). Adopting the notation from the first stage of training, the presentation of AXY will allow ax and ay to become active. If this is the case, and ax and ay gain associative strength in the same way as conventional conditioned stimuli (CSs; see Rescorla, 2000) , then ay should gain greater associative strength than ax because the associative strength of ay is more discrepant from the asymptote supported by the outcome of the trial (i.e., food) than is the associative strength of ax. To assess this prediction, we placed rats in a new, hybrid Context AC (e.g., an operant chamber with check walls and a warm floor) and gave them separate presentations of X and Y; that is, the rats received ACX and ACY trials.
If we start off by ignoring any effects that the revaluation stage might have, it should be clear that ACX and ACY will activate one representation with excitatory associative strength (i.e., ax or cy) and one with less excitatory associative strength (i.e., cx or ay), and there is no reason to anticipate differences in responding during the two test compounds. Moreover, if one considers the separate components of the test trials (i.e., A, C, X, and Y), then there is no reason to anticipate a difference in responding on ACX and ACY trials: At the end of conditional training, Contexts A and C should have equivalent associative strengths, and the context presented during revaluation, A, and the remaining context, C, are presented on both types of test trials. Similarly, after conditional training, X and Y should have equivalent associative strengths and both are paired with food during revaluation. Furthermore, if the revaluation stage results in equivalent changes in the associative strength of ax and ay (cf. Pearce, 1994; , then there is again no reason to anticipate a difference in responding to the test compounds. However, if ay acquired greater associative strength than ax during the revaluation procedure then there should be more responding on ACY trials (when ay and cy are active) than on ACX trials (when ax and cx are active).
The theoretical analysis outlined above and summarized in Table 1 does not include the possibility that the three-element compounds (i.e., AXY, ACX, and ACY) will generate additional or other representations (e.g., axy, acx, and acy, respectively) that will be learned about during revaluation and influence performance at test. The inclusion of such representations does not influence the predictions made by the unique-cue account or the connectionist analysis unless, of course, one supposes that either (a) axy acquired all of the available associative strength during revaluation or (b) acx and acy completely dominated test performance. While neither the unique-cue nor the connectionist analysis need suppose that either of these possibilities will be the case, the configural model developed by Pearce (1994) is in a different position. It assumes that the revaluation trial will only allow the configural representation generated by the novel AXY pattern itself (i.e., axy) to acquire associative strength, with the amount of associative change being influenced by the (generalized) tendency of ax, ay, cx, and cy to activate the unconditioned stimulus representation. The associative strength acquired by axy will then generalize to other compounds to the extent that they are similar to AXY: It will generalize equally to the representations of AX (ax) and AY (ay) and rather less, but again equally, to CX (cx) and CY (cy); and finally it will generalize equally well to ACX (acx) and ACY (acy). Given the symmetry in the effects of revaluation on the representations to which acx and acy are similar, it is clear that Pearce's model predicts that responding during ACX (acx) and ACY (acy) will be equivalent. It is worth emphasizing that this prediction does not simply reflect the fact that Pearce's model (like the Rescorla-Wagner model) uses a pooled error term to determine changes in associative strength. Instead it reflects the assumption that the only representation that changes in associative strength on a given trial is that generated by the pattern of stimulation that is actually present (in this case the representation axy that is generated by the AXY pattern).
Method
Subjects. Charles River Ltd., U.K., supplied the 32 naive male Lister Hooded rats (Rattus norvegicus) used in Experiment 1. These rats were maintained at 80% of their ad-lib weight (range ϭ 287-338 g, M ϭ 321 g) by receiving a restricted amount of food supplied by Harlan Tekland (Bicester, Oxfordshire, England). The rats were housed in pairs in a colony room illuminated between 8 a.m. and 10 p.m., with testing starting at 10 a.m. All rats had unrestricted access to water when they were in their home cages.
Apparatus. Four operant chambers (Campden Instruments Ltd., Loughborough, England; Test Chamber CI-410) arranged in a 2 ϫ 2 array were used. Each chamber (24.5 cm wide ϫ 23 cm deep ϫ 21 cm high) was positioned within a box, the door of which remained open. Each chamber had three aluminum walls and an aluminum ceiling. The front wall was constructed from transparent plastic and served as the door to the chamber. There was a food well in the left-hand aluminum wall (measuring 6 cm high, 5 cm wide, and 4 cm deep) into which 45-mg food pellets (supplied by P. J. Noyes, Lancaster, NH) could be delivered. A top-hinged transparent plastic flap guarded access to this food well. Two retractable levers inside the operant chamber were withdrawn, and food-well entries were automatically recorded when the top-hinged magazine flap was pushed approximately 2 mm. A 3-W lightbulb positioned in the center of the ceiling panel of each chamber provided local illumination. The experimental room in which the chambers were housed was otherwise in darkness.
The right-hand pair of chambers (the visual contexts) were lined with either spotted (top chamber) or checked wallpaper (lower chamber), mounted behind transparent plastic panels (for a detailed description of the wallpapers, see Honey & Watt, 1999) . The left-hand pair of chambers (the thermal contexts) were created by replacing the standard 16-bar grid floor (stainless steel bars, diameter 0.47 cm, spacing from bar center to bar center, 0.93 cm) fitted in the visual contexts, with an aluminum sheet floor (24.5 ϫ 23.5 cm). The aluminum floor had a bracket attached to the underside, into which two Thermos picnic blocks, either heated or frozen, could be inserted, thus creating the "warm" (35°C; top chamber) or "cool" (10°C; lower chamber) contexts (for a full description, see Ward-Robinson & Honey, 2000 .) The walls of these thermal contexts remained undecorated.
The stimuli (X and Y) were a 2-kHz tone (approximately 78 dB) and a 3-W light. The tone was presented through a loudspeaker that was located within the ceiling of each chamber and the light consisted of the operation of two 3-W lightbulbs that were positioned on either side of the food well (15.0 cm above the floor and 12.5 cm apart, center to center).
Conditional discrimination training. On Days 1 and 2, rats received magazine training. In each 20-min session, 20 food pellets were delivered on a variable time, 60-s schedule. In the first of these sessions, the door to the food well was taped open, allowing the rat unrestricted access to the pellets. On the second session the door was returned to its normal position. During these 2 days the chambers were undecorated and had standard floors. On each of the next 8 days of training, each rat received two sessions of training, one in Context A and the other in Context C. For half of the rats, Context A was a thermal context (either warm or cool) and Context C was a visual context (spotted or checked), and for the remaining rats this arrangement was reversed. For half of the rats in each of these subgroups the thermal context was warm, and for the remaining rats it was cool. Similarly, for half of the rats the visual context was spotted, and for the remaining rats it was checked. An equal number of rats (4) received spotted and warm, spotted and cool, checked and warm, or checked and cool. In Context A, presentations of Stimulus X (e.g., a tone) were followed by the delivery of two food pellets, and those of Stimulus Y (e.g., a light) were not, and in Context C, presentations of Y were reinforced, and those of X were not (see Table 1 ). On Days 1, 4, 5, and 8, rats were placed in Context A during the first session and C during the second session and on Days 2, 3, 6, and 7 the reverse was the case. For half of the rats, Stimulus X was the tone and Stimulus Y was the light, and for the remaining rats this arrangement was reversed. The stimuli were 10 s in duration, and the intertrial interval (ITI) was 30 s. In each 14-min session, there were 10 presentations of each stimulus. X and Y were presented according to two pseudorandom sequences that had the constraint that there were no more than two presentations of X or Y in succession. The sequences were transpositions of one another with respect to the order in which X and Y were presented and were used in an alternating schedule across the 8 days of training.
Revaluation and test trials. On the 3 days of revaluation training, each rat was placed in Context A and was given 20 simultaneous presentations of X and Y that were followed by the delivery of two food pellets; that is, rats received 20 AXY 3 food trials. The duration of each compound was 10 s and the ITI was again 30 s. On the test day, rats were placed in a hybrid test chamber that combined elements of Contexts A and C. To achieve this, we had replaced the standard floor in each wallpapered chamber with thermal flooring. During the two test sessions, there were 4 separate nonreinforced presentations of X and Y; that is, rats received 4 ACX trials and 4 ACY trials. For half of the rats the order in which X and Y were Note. A and C denote visual and thermal contexts (e.g., chambers with either spotted walls or a warm floor), and X and Y denote auditory and visual stimuli (tone and light); food and no food indicate trials on which the outcome of the trials were food and no food; ax, ay, cx, and cy are representations that are presumed active on the various trials involving A, C, X, and Y (see text for details).
presented in the AC contexts was XYYXYXXY in the first session and YXXYXYYX in the second session, and for the remaining rats this arrangement was reversed. The test sessions were separated from one another by an interval of approximately 2 hr, and during both tests the number of magazine entries during each stimulus was recorded. To gain an increased sample of behavior, we increased the duration of each stimulus to 20 s during these test trials. The ITI was 30 s. Behavioral measures. To assess acquisition of the conditional discrimination, we calculated discrimination ratios by dividing the mean rate of responding (in responses per minute, rpm) to the reinforced stimuli by the mean rate of responding to both the reinforced and nonreinforced stimuli. Discrimination ratios that exceed 0.5 indicate that responding is greater during reinforced than nonreinforced stimulus presentations. Test performance was assessed using the rates of responding during X and Y on the ACX and BCY trials, respectively.
Results
Acquisition of the conditional discrimination proceeded without incident. There was a substantial and significant increase in the discrimination ratios from the first day of training (M ϭ 0.48) to the final day of training (M ϭ 0.70), F(1, 31) ϭ 62.55, p Ͻ .001. On Day 8 of training, there was a marked and significant difference between responding on reinforced (14.19 rpm) and nonreinforced trials (5.81 rpm), F(1, 31) ϭ 39.29, p Ͻ .001. The mean rates of responding across the 3 revaluation days were 14.98, 15.72, and 17.49 rpm, respectively. Although it is apparent that there was some increase in responding across these 3 days, analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that this increase was not statistically significant, F(2, 31) ϭ 2.07, p Ͼ .11. This is not entirely surprising given the fact that the scores represent a mean of the 20 trials on each day, and there is consequently good reason to suppose that responding would have increased substantially during the first day of training. Figure 1 shows the results from the first three trials pooled across both test sessions; on the final trial of both test sessions rats responded at a low and equivalent level to both test compounds (ACX: 8.76 rpm; ACY: 7.89 rpm; F Ͻ 1). Inspection of Figure 1 reveals that there was more responding during ACY than during ACX trials, and ANOVA confirmed that the difference was statistically significant, F(1, 31) ϭ 4.27, p Ͻ .05.
Discussion
Rats first acquired a conditional discrimination in which when they were placed in Context A they received reinforced presentations of X and nonreinforced presentations of Y (i.e., AX 3 food and AY 3 no food) and when they were placed in Context C they received reinforced presentations of Y and nonreinforced presentations of X (i.e., CY 3 food and CX 3 no food). To solve such a discrimination, rats must represent each of the combinations (see Table 1 ) and associate the resulting representations with the outcome that they precede (food or no food). After rats had acquired the conditional discrimination, they received a revaluation procedure in which they were placed in Context A and received compound presentations of X and Y that were paired with the delivery of food (i.e., AXY 3 food). On these AXY 3 food trials we can assume that the representations of AX and AY (i.e., ax and ay, respectively) become active (and perhaps that some other representation, axy, might also become active). The question of interest was whether ax (previously associated with food) or ay (previously associated with no food), or neither, would acquire most associative strength on these trials. The finding that responding was more marked on ACY than on ACX test trials suggests that ay had acquired more associative strength than ax. This pattern of results, using a conditional discrimination procedure, parallels that observed by Rescorla (2000) using a simple conditioning procedure and is inconsistent both with models proposed by Rescorla and Wagner (1972; see also Wagner & Rescorla, 1972) and by Pearce (1994) . In Experiment 2 we attempt to explore the generality of the results from Experiment 1 and to further refine our understanding of the nature of the notional elements ax, ay, cx, and cy. In particular, Experiment 2 examines whether they are best considered to be unique cues (e.g., in the manner of or hidden units in a three-layer connectionist network (see, e.g., .
Experiment 2
The design of Experiment 2 is summarized in the upper part of Table 2 . In the first stage, all rats received four training sessions on each day. When rats were placed in Contexts A and B they received presentations of Stimulus X (e.g., a tone) that were paired with food, and presentations of Stimulus Y (e.g., a light) that were not; and when placed in Contexts C and D, they received reinforced presentations of Y and nonreinforced presentations of X. To acquire this discrimination, rats again need some way of representing the fact that some combinations of stimuli are followed by food (i.e., AX, BX, CY, and DY) while others are not (i.e., AY, BY, CX, and DX). The middle part of Table 2 illustrates one way in which this could be achieved. It is derived from the suggestion that each combination of stimuli generates a unique cue (Brandon et al., 2000; ) that becomes associated with the outcome of the trial that it precedes. According to such an account, each context-stimulus combination (AX-DY) activates a unique representation (in this case, ax-dy), and while four become associated with food (i.e., ax, bx, cy, and dy) the remaining four do not (i.e., ay, by, cx, and dx). Table 1 for a summary of the experimental design.
The revaluation stage of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1: Rats received AXY3 food trials. According to the unique-cue account, these revaluation trials should result in ax and ay becoming active and acquiring associative strength (perhaps together with a unique cue activated by the new AXY compound). If the results of Experiment 1 are replicable, then ay should acquire more associative strength than ax during this revaluation procedure. During the critical test trials, rats received presentations of BCX and BCY. According to the unique-cue account, in addition to any unique cues activated by these novel compounds, bx and cx will become active during BCX, whereas by and cy will become active during BCY. That is, BCX and BCY trials will result in the activation of one unique cue that was associated with food and one that was associated with no food during initial conditional training. Thus BCX will activate bx and cx, and BCY will activate cy and by. However, given the fact that none of these unique cues were active on the revaluation trials, this account provides no grounds for predicting a difference in responding during the two types of test trial, BCX and BCY. For similar reasons, Pearce's model provides no grounds to predict such a difference either.
An alternative way in which the rats could represent the eight trial types is shown in the lower part of Table 2 and is derived from connectionist approaches to associative learning (for a recent discussion, see ; see also, e.g., Gluck & Myers, 1993; Maki, 1993) . According to this scheme, compounds that are similar to one another (by virtue of the presence of X or Y) and are followed by the same outcome (e.g., AX and BX, but not AX and CX nor AX and CY) become linked to the same hidden unit.
1 That is, AX and BX become linked to abx, CX and DX become linked to cdx, AY and BY become linked to aby, and CY and DY become linked to cdy (see Figure 2) . In this way, such networks can be said to implement the principles of redundancy compression and predictive differentiation (see Gluck & Myers, 1993 )-combining similar compounds that predict the same outcome (e.g., AX and BX) and separating these from those that predict different outcomes (e.g., CX and DX). In any event, this type of analysis has received support from a series of recent experiments from our laboratory (e.g., see Coutureau et al., 2002; Hodder et al., 2003; Honey & Watt, 1998 , 1999 Honey & WardRobinson, 2001 Ward-Robinson & Honey, 2000) and makes quite different predictions from the unique-cue account concerning the effect of the revaluation procedure on test performance. According to the connectionist account, during the revaluation procedure presentations of AXY should result in the activation of abx and aby. If the results of Experiment 1 are replicable, then during these revaluation trials aby should acquire greater associative strength than abx. On the test trials, therefore, responding should be more marked during presentations of BCY (when aby and cdy are active) than during those of BCX (when abx and cdx are active). Experiment 2 tested the differential predictions made by the unique-cue (and configural) account and the connectionist analysis.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-two experimentally naive male Hooded Lister rats (supplied by Harlan Olac, England) were maintained at 80% of their ad-lib weight (range ϭ 350 -455g, M ϭ 393 g).
Apparatus and procedure. The housing conditions, apparatus, and contexts were the same as in Experiment 1 with the exception that the position (upper or lower left-hand chamber) of the thermal context (warm or cool) alternated according to a pseudorandom sequence (see WardRobinson & Honey, 2000) . Conditional discrimination training proceeded 1 We assume that the presence of a shared auditory or visual stimulus (X or Y) represents the principal source of similarity between our compounds (e.g., between AX and BX) while recognizing that Contexts A, B, C, and D also share other common elements that we assume to be less salient. in the same way as in Experiment 1, with the exception that all rats received four training sessions on each of the 8 days, one in each of the four contexts (A, B, C, and D). In Contexts A and B, presentations of Stimulus X (e.g., a tone) were followed by the delivery of two food pellets, and presentations of Stimulus Y (e.g., a light) were not; and in Contexts C and D, presentations of Y were reinforced and those of X were not (see Table  2 ). For half of the rats, the visual contexts served as A and C and the thermal contexts served as B and D, and for the remaining rats this arrangement was reversed. The identities of the contexts or stimuli serving as A and C, B and D, and X and Y were fully counterbalanced. The sequence in which Contexts A, B, C, and D were presented changed across days. For both 4-day blocks of training, a given context was presented in each of the four positions within the sequence (first, second, third, and fourth), and within this set of sequences being placed in one context (e.g., A) was equally likely to be immediately preceded or followed by placement in each of the other contexts (B, C and D). The revaluation stage was conducted in an identical fashion to Experiment 1. That is, all rats received 20 AXY 3 food trials on each of 3 days. On the test day, rats received four 20-s nonreinforced presentations BCX and BCY. They received two such tests, Test 1 and Test 2, that were separated from one another by 2 hr and were conducted in the same way as the tests in Experiment 1.
Results
Acquisition of the conditional discrimination proceeded uneventfully, and again there was a substantial and significant increase in the discrimination ratios from the first day of training (0.49) to the final day of training (0.61) , F(1, 31) Figure 3 shows the results from the test trials, in the first and second tests, pooled across the four test trials with each stimulus in each test. Inspection of the left-hand panel reveals that during Test 1 there was no marked difference between the levels of responding during presentations of X and Y, whereas the right-hand panel shows that during Test 2 responding was more marked during presentations of Y than during those of X. ANOVA with stimulus (X or Y) and test (1 or 2) as factors revealed no effect of stimulus (F Ͻ 1); an effect of test, F(1, 31) ϭ 4.68, p Ͻ .05; and an interaction between these factors, F(1, 31) ϭ 4.66, p Ͻ .05. Analysis of simple main effects revealed that there was no effect of stimulus during Test 1 (F Ͻ 1), but there was an effect of stimulus during Test 2, F(1, 31) ϭ 8.15, p Ͻ .01; and that there was an effect of test session on responding during BCX, F(1, 31) ϭ 15.70, p Ͻ .01, but no effect of test session on responding during BCY (F Ͻ 1). The observation that the effect of interest was only evident in Test 2 might simply reflect the fact that a ceiling effect obscured differences during Test 1, or that the combination of contexts (or of the contexts with stimuli) resulted in some general disruption that reduced the likelihood of observing the effect and that was more evident in Test 1 than it was in Test 2 (see also Hodder et al., 2003; . However, it remains the case that in Experiment 1 the effect of interest was only evident during the initial test trials of both sessions. Thus although the results of Experiments 1 and 2 are broadly comparable, it is disquieting that the effect of interest was evident at different points during testing in the two experiments. We therefore felt it prudent to replicate and extend the results of Experiment 2.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 extend the generality of those from Experiment 1 in showing that when the representations acquired during conditional learning are conditioned in compound they are subject to the same form of changes in associative strength as simple Pavlovian CSs (see Rescorla, 2000) . However, the results of Experiment 2, unlike those of Experiment 1, allow us to say more about the nature of these representations. If one supposes that each conjunction of stimuli results in a unique or configural representation, then there would be no clear-cut grounds for ob- Figure 2 . A connectionist architecture in which compound stimuli (e.g., AX and BX) that are both similar (by virtue of the presence of X or Y) and followed by the same outcome (e.g., food) have become linked to the same hidden layer unit (e.g., abx). Simulations reveal that such hidden units develop as a result of allowing activity produced by the outcome of a trial (e.g., food) to influence (via the outcome-to-hidden layer links) the selection of which hidden unit wins the competition to be learned about on a given trial. In these simulations, when the network initially receives a pattern of input across the input layer (e.g., a and x), it generates a prediction (or performance) based on the hidden unit that wins an initial competition and which of the output units that this hidden unit activates (food or no food). Here, the probability that a given hidden unit is selected as the winner increases as the difference decreases between (1) the total weighted (and then normalized) activity that it receives from the input units and (2) that of the maximally active hidden unit (on which the normalization process was based). However, once the outcome is presented this selection process is repeated with the influence of the now active output unit included. At this point, changes are made to the strength of links between the input units (a, b, c, d, x, or y) activated by the stimuli presented on that trial (A, B, C, D, X, or Y) and the winning unit, and to the reciprocal links between the winning unit and the output unit (food or no food) activated by outcome of the trial. A comparison of simulations with different numbers of hidden units reveals that as the number of hidden units in the network increases, so the pattern of links within a network trained on the conditional discrimination shown on the left-hand side of Table 2 becomes that caricatured in Figure 2. serving the pattern of results found in Experiment 2. In brief, if these representations became active during the revaluation stage (when AXY was paired with food), then they might change in associative strength. However, because they will not be activated by either of the test compounds, then there should be no difference in responding between BCX and BCY. By contrast, the alternative, connectionist analysis provides a ready account for the results of both Experiments 1 and 2. The basis on which this analysis succeeds in providing an account for the results of Experiment 2 is that the hidden units that are activated and acquire associative strength during the revaluation trials with AXY (abx and aby) also become active and influence performance during the BCX and BCY test trials (see Table 2 ). In Experiment 3 we attempt to replicate and extend the results of Experiment 2 and to rule out an ingenious alternative unique-cue (or configural) analysis that was outlined by an anonymous reviewer.
Experiment 3
Rescorla (2000) demonstrated that when two stimuli (A and B) are nonreinforced in compound, the decrease in associative strength is greater for the stimulus that had been previously paired with food (A) than for the stimulus that had been paired with no food (B). This result is important when taken in conjunction with the finding that when such a compound is reinforced it is B that undergoes the greater increase in associative strength: Together these results established that the critical factor that influences the change in associative strength of the components of a compound is the discrepancy between their associative strength and the outcome that follows the compound rather than the associative strength that they bring to the compound per se. Experiment 3 used the same design as Experiment 2 (see Table 2 ) with the notable exception that presentations of AXY were nonreinforced during the revaluation stage. According to the unique-cue and configural analyses outlined in the context of Experiment 2, on the revaluation trials ax or abx will become active as will ay or aby; but because ax and abx have excitatory associative strength the decrease in their associative strength will be greater than that of ay and aby. However, as in Experiment 2, any change in the associative strength of ax and ay should not influence performance during BCX and BCY. According to our connectionist analysis, however, any change in the associative strength hidden units abx and aby will be reflected in performance to BCX (when abx and cdx will be active) and BCY (when aby and cdy will be active). If Rescorla's observations from Pavlovian conditioning hold when a conditional discrimination is used, and a connectionist framework is adopted, then we should expect to observe less responding during BCX than BCY.
The first replication of Experiment 3 used exactly the same stimuli as Experiment 2, whereas the second replication used a different set of contexts but was in other respects identical. The use of this new set of contexts not only allowed us to assess the generality of the effect sought in the first replication but also to rule out an alternative unique-cue or configural analysis. This alternative analysis allows the theoretical ideas summarized in the middle part of Table 2 to explain the pattern of results from Experiment 2, by assuming that the way in which we chose to counterbalance the contexts during conditional training in Experiment 2 would have allowed differences in generalization between different compounds.
In Experiment 2 the contexts in which X and Y's relationships with food and no food were equivalent (A and B; C and D) were always taken from different dimensions (i.e., one visual, A or C, and the other thermal, B or D). This arrangement allowed us to maintain consistency with previous studies (e.g., and allowed B (e.g., a thermal context) and C (e.g., a visual context) to be readily combined during the test. However, it also meant that for all rats Contexts A and C were from the same modality (either both visual or both thermal) as were Contexts B and D. The reason that this fact might provide grounds for an alternative analysis for the results of Experiment 2 can be best appreciated by returning to Table 2 and then considering the similarity between the various stimulus compounds that a representative rat might have received during the conditional discrimination.
Let us suppose that the representations (ax, ay, cx, and cy) involving A and C (e.g., the visual contexts) are, other things being equal, more similar to one another than they are to representations (bx, by, dx, and dy) involving the thermal contexts (B and D). Now suppose that the representation ay is more similar to cy than to cx Table 2 for a summary of the experimental design.
by virtue of the presence of y; and by the same token, ax is more similar to cx than to cy by virtue of the presence of x. Now assume that there will be a greater change in the associative strength of ay than of ax during the revaluation trials when AXY is paired with food because ay predicts no food and ax predicts food (see Experiment 1). This change in ay's associative strength will then generalize more readily to cy than to any other representation (bx, by, and cx): ay is especially similar to cy because both involve the same contextual modality and because y is present in both. In this way, the unique-cue account could predict greater responding during BCY trials (when cy or by is active) than during BCX trials (when cx or bx is active).
At first sight this analysis seems both plausible and rather persuasive. However, it should be recognized that it rests on two assumptions that do not sit very comfortably with one another: One must assume that cy and cx are (a) sufficiently dissimilar to ay and ax, respectively, to allow ay to acquire greater strength than ax during revaluation, but (b) sufficiently similar to ay and ax to allow this difference in the associative strength of ay and ax to generalize to cy and cx during the test. Without the first assumption, the fact that conditional training resulted in cy becoming associated with food and cx with no food should generalize to ay and ax, respectively, during the revaluation stage and undermine their tendency to acquire different amounts of associative strength. Without the second assumption, there would be no basis on which to account for the test results. One way in which these otherwise incongruous assumptions could be reconciled, however, would be to suppose that generalization between two representations (e.g., cy and ay) has less impact on the acquisition of associative strength (e.g., by ay during revaluation) than it does on performance (e.g., to cy during the test).
The second replication of Experiment 3 used an experimental design that was identical to the first but replaced the pairs of visual and thermal contexts with four contexts (cool, spotted, object, odor). This new set of contexts allowed (a) the equivalently trained contexts (A and B; C and D) to differ from one another in a number of respects, (b) B and C to be readily combined, and, critically, (c) the identities of the contexts to be counterbalanced in such a way that A and C were, on average, no more similar to one another than they were to B and D. If the first and second replications of Experiment 3 produce similar patterns of test results, then the analysis developed in the two preceding paragraphs would be ruled out. Moreover, the results of Experiment 3 should also allow us to replicate and extend those of Experiments 1 and 2.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-two experimentally naïve male Hooded Lister rats (supplied by Harlan Olac, England) were used in each replication of the experiment. They were maintained at 80% of their ad-lib weight (Replication 1: range ϭ 349 -378 g, M ϭ 369 g; Replication 2: range ϭ 343-394 g, M ϭ 366 g). The housing conditions were the same as in Experiment 1.
Apparatus and conditional discrimination training. In the first replication of Experiment 3, the contexts were identical to those of Experiment 2. In the second replication of Experiment 3, the four contexts (cool, spotted, object, odor) serving as A, B, C, and D differed in a number of respects from one another. The cool context (lower-left chamber) and spotted context (upper-right chamber) were those described in Experiment 1. The object context (lower-right chamber) was created by placing an upturned square clear glass slide bath (used in histology; 6 cm high ϫ 11.8 cm 2 ) into the far right-hand corner of an otherwise standard chamber with a grid floor. The upper surface of this object was wiped clean after each session, and the object was washed thoroughly after each day of training. The object weighed 695 g, and although it was not attached to the chamber the position of the object remained relatively unchanged from the beginning to the end of a session. The odor context (upper-left chamber) was created by attaching a red odor cube to the center of the inside face of the door to an otherwise standard chamber. The cube (measuring approximately 4.6 cm 3 ) contained a vanilla-scented pad (both supplied by Dale Air Ltd., Lancs, England) and was held in position by small Velcro pads. One side of the cube (that facing the back wall of the chamber) was perforated with six small holes that enabled the odor to diffuse into the chamber. These holes were sealed at the end of each test day to reduce the likelihood of cross-context odor contamination. The cubes were replaced every 3 days during training to ensure the intensity of the odor remained relatively constant. Throughout all experimental sessions the doors to the sound-and light-attenuating boxes that contained the chambers were closed; this was a further measure to prevent cross-context contamination.
The contexts that served as A, B, C, and D were counterbalanced in the following way. For all rats, the hybrid test context (BC) consisted of combining the spotted and cool contexts in the same way as Experiment 2 and Replication 1. For half of the rats, Context B was cool and C was spotted, and for the remaining rats this arrangement was reversed. For half of the rats in each of these two subgroups, Context A was the odor and Context D was the object, and for the remaining rats this arrangement was reversed. This arrangement ensures that contexts serving as A and C are no more similar to one another than they are to B and D and thereby rules out the alternative configural analysis developed in the introduction to Experiment 3. In all other respects, the procedure used during the initial stages of Experiment 3 (i.e., magazine training and conditional discrimination training) was identical to that of Experiment 2.
Revaluation and test procedure. Rats in both replications received 3 days of revaluation training, with two training sessions per day, separated by approximately 2 hr. During each of these sessions rats were placed into Context A and received 20 nonreinforced presentations of the tone and light in compound (i.e., AXY 3 no food). The number of revaluation sessions was increased for Experiment 3 because a pilot study revealed that three sessions of nonreinforced training did not produce any difference in performance during the test. On the next day, all rats received one test session in which they were placed in Context BC and received four 4 BCX and BCY trials) . Other details of the test session were identical to Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Rats in both replications (henceforth 1 and 2) of Experiment 3 acquired the conditional discrimination: There was a substantial and significant increase in the discrimination ratios from the first day of training (1: 0.50; 2: 0.50) to the final day of training (1: 0.60; 2: 0.60)-an increase that was highly consistent across the replications. ANOVA with replication and day as factors revealed that there was no effect of replication (F Ͻ 1); an effect of day, F(1, 62) ϭ 61.83, p Ͻ .01; and no interaction between these factors (F Ͻ 1). By the final day of training there was a marked and significant difference between responding on reinforced (1: 13.34 rpm; 2: 12.02 rpm) and nonreinforced trials (1: 8.70 rpm; 2: 7.63 rpm). ANOVA with replication and trial type as factors revealed no effect of replication, F(1, 62) ϭ 2.40, p Ͼ .12; an effect of trial type, F(1, 62) ϭ 66.21, p Ͻ .01; and no interaction between these factors (F Ͻ 1). The mean rates of responding on nonreinforced presentations of AXY during revaluation were initially higher, and then declined more rapidly, in Replication 1 than in Replication 2; but in both replications there was a substantial decrease in responding across the six revaluation sessions (1: 11.57, 8.43, 3.93, 4.57, 3.59, and 2.55 rpm; 2: 8.11, 7.27, 5.44, 4.79, 2.82, and 2.40 rpm) . ANOVA revealed that there was no effect of replication, F(1, 62) Figure 4 shows the test results from Experiment 3, with those from the first replication in the left-hand panel and those from the second replication in the right-hand panel. Inspection of Figure 4 reveals that the level of responding was slightly higher in the first replication than the second, but that in both replications there was less responding during BCX than BCY. ANOVA with stimulus (BCX or BCY) and replication as factors revealed an effect of stimulus, F(1, 62) ϭ 7.29, p Ͻ .01; no effect of replication, F(1, 62) ϭ 1.82, p Ͼ .18; and no interaction between these factors (F Ͻ 1).
The results of Experiment 3 thereby reinforce the conclusions based on those of Experiments 1 and 2. The representations acquired during a conditional discrimination are subject to the same increases (Experiments 1 and 2) and decreases (Experiment 3) in associative strength that conventional stimuli undergo when conditioned or extinguished in compound (Rescorla, 2000) ; these representations are best conceived as hidden units within a connectionist network rather than as unique cues or configural representations that simply code for conjunctions of stimuli that have been presented by the experimenter.
General Discussion Rescorla (2000) investigated whether the associative change that the components of a compound stimulus (e.g., AB) undergo is affected by the associative strength that each brings to that compound through prior training. His results indicated that when a compound comprising a stimulus associated with food (A) and one associated with no food (B) was paired with food, B gained more associative strength than A, whereas when the compound was followed by no food A lost more associative strength than B. This pattern of results is theoretically noteworthy because it is not predicted by several, otherwise well-supported, models of associative learning (e.g., Pearce, 1994; . The reason for this is that in these models associative changes are driven by the discrepancy between the amount of learning supportable by the outcome of the trial () and the sum of the associative strengths of all stimuli that are present on that trial; in the case under consideration, associative learning is driven by a pooled error term ( -⌺V AϩB ). According to this analysis, other things being equal, the associative change that A and B undergo when they are conditioned in compound should have been equivalent and independent of the associative strength that each brings to the compound through prior conditioning. The observations that Rescorla (2000) reported came from studies of simple Pavlovian conditioning, and we attempted to examine whether similar findings can be observed in conditional learning procedures. In such procedures, one needs to appeal to associative structures that are more complex than those ordinarily applied to simple Pavlovian conditioning. The rules determining associative change in conditional learning might or might not be the same as those that obtain in simple Pavlovian conditioning.
The results of Experiments 1-3 suggest that the effects that Rescorla observed are also apparent in more complex conditional learning procedures. Moreover, our results also provide insight into the nature of the representations acquired during conditional learning. For example, the results of Experiments 1-3 are not predicted by the analysis of conditional learning provided by Pearce's (1994) configural model, and those of Experiments 2 and 3 are not predicted by the unique-cue account of conditional learning (e.g., . Instead the results of these experiments lend support to a connectionist analysis. According to such an analysis, during conditional training input units Table 2 ) with the exception that the revaluation trials with AXY were not followed by food. The experimental design used in Replications 1 (left) and 2 (right) was identical and the two differed in terms of the set of contexts that served as A, B, C, and D.
activated by the stimuli presented on different trials (e.g., A, B, C, D, X, and Y) become linked to units in a hidden layer (abx, aby, cdx, and cdy), which, in turn, are linked to the units activated by the outcome of a trial (i.e., food and no food). We have illustrated, in Tables 1 and 2 , the way in which such a framework can be applied to the designs used in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Clearly then, the effects that we have seen parallel those observed by Rescorla (2000) and, equally clearly, an analysis of these effects will need to appeal to changes in the associative strengths of the hidden units (or some equivalent entities) that take place during the revaluation stage. However, we have yet to provide any specific analysis of the means by which the revaluation procedure influences test performance. We now consider two possibilities that were foreshadowed by Rescorla's analysis of his own results.
Consider again Experiment 2, while bearing in mind that the same form of analysis applies to the results of Experiments 1 and 3. We suppose that conditional training will result in the components of the AX and BX compounds being linked to hidden unit abx, those of AY and BY being linked to aby, CX and DX being linked to cdx, and CY and DY being linked to cdy; and we suppose that whereas abx and cdy will be linked to the food output unit, aby and cdx will be linked to the no-food unit (for a detailed analysis of how this pattern of links is brought about, see . The fact that during the test, responding was more evident when aby and cdy became active (on BCY trials) than when abx and cdx became active (on BCX trials) must reflect something that occurred during the revaluation stage when AXY was presented and abx and aby became active prior to the delivery of food (see Table 2 ). One possibility appeals not to changes in the links between abx and the food output unit or between aby and this unit, but instead to the notion that links might have formed between abx and aby. These within-layer links would mean that on BCY trials, aby, cdy, and abx would become active, whereas during BCX trials, abx, cdx, and aby would become active. Given our supposition that abx and cdy are linked to the food output unit whereas cdx and aby are linked to the no-food unit, then it follows that the hidden units that could become active on a BCY trial will have a greater combined tendency to activate the food output unit than will those activated on a BCX trial: BCY can activate one hidden unit that is linked to the no-food unit (aby) and two hidden units that are linked to the food unit (cdy, and abx through the within-layer aby-abx link); whereas BCX can activate two hidden units that are linked to the no-food unit (cdx, and aby through the abx-aby link) and only one hidden unit that is linked to food (abx). This is, no doubt, an intriguing possibility: It both shadows Rescorla's use of the notion of within-compound associations to explain his own results and resonates with recent claims that excitatory associations might form between two representations that are associatively activated (e.g., Dwyer, Mackintosh, & Boakes, 1998) . In the present case, it is necessary to assume that these associations are between the notional hidden units within a three-layer network. There is, however, evidence from procedures very like those used in Experiments 1-3 that should give one reason to be cautious before accepting an analysis of the results of these experiments in terms of the formation of within-layer associations. This evidence does not preclude the possibility that there was any co-occurrence of activity in units abx and aby during the revaluation stage, but it certainly renders the possibility far less plausible.
Honey and Ward-Robinson (2002, Experiment 1) gave rats identical conditional discrimination training to that received by rats in Experiments 2 and 3 (see Table 2 ). They then gave rats test trials with combinations of contexts (e.g., AB and AD). Although the mean level of responding (magazine entries) was very similar in the two hybrid contexts, the level of variability was significantly greater in AB than in AD. Honey and Ward-Robinson supposed that this difference reflected two features of (some) connectionist networks that we have yet to consider: first, that only one hidden unit (the "winner") can become active at a given point in time, and, second, that the output of this unit is a sigmoidal function of the input that it has received. These features have a number of obvious consequences. On the one hand, when the rats were placed in AB, either abx or aby would become very active and either provoke vigorous conditioned responding (in rats for whom abx had become active) or very little (in rats for whom aby had become active) as both would receive dual sources of activation from the input units. On the other hand, when rats were placed in AD, abx, aby, cdx, or cdy might become active, but the level of conditioned responding would be neither very vigorous (when either abx or cdy became active) nor especially low (when either aby or cdx became active) as each would receive only a single source of activation from an input unit. These results and the analysis that they support (together with other evidence and considerations; see cast doubt on the analysis presented in the previous paragraph and (at once) suggest a natural alternative to it.
If it is supposed that on any given revaluation trial only one of the hidden units that could become active, either abx or aby, is actually active when food is delivered, then gains in the tendency of aby to activate the food unit will be greater than those of abx to activate that unit-by dint of the discrepancy between the associative strengths of abx and aby and the asymptote supported by the outcome of the revaluation trial. It should be apparent that other results, like those reported by Rescorla (2000) , are subject to the same form of analysis: If the representation of A or B, but not both, is active at the point at which food is delivered, then B will acquire more associative strength than A. It is noteworthy that the analysis developed in this paragraph is similar, in some respects, to the model described by Mackintosh (1975) . In brief, unlike the Rescorla-Wagner model, Mackintosh supposed that for each component of a compound there is a separate error term. In the present context, while the Rescorla-Wagner model assumes that the change in associative strength of hidden units abx and aby during the revaluation stage would be affected by the error term ( -⌺V abxϩaby ), in Mackintosh's formulation it would be given by ( -V abx ) and ( -V aby ), respectively. Although the implementation of this idea was not his primary concern, the suggestion that only a single stimulus representation, in our case abx or aby, can become active at a particular time is one way in which this could be achieved, because this would allow the processes that implement the error term to operate independently on the representations of the components of a compound.
The general notion that there is a limit on the number of representations that can become active at any point in time, and that there are fluctuations across time in which units are activated by the same physical stimulus (e.g., AB; see Honey & WardRobinson, 2002) , is certainly consistent with the attentional overtones of Mackintosh's (1975) model (see also Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971 ). However, unlike Mackintosh's original formulation, our analysis can provide an account for the fact that conditioned inhibition accrues to a stimulus, X, as the result of training in which A is paired with food and AX is presented but no food is delivered. Suppose that initially the input-to-hidden layer links are random and that when A is presented and followed by food this relationship is represented by the strengthening of the chain of links: A 3 a 3 food. Now, when AX is presented it might initially activate a, by virtue of the presence of A, and this will result in the food output unit becoming active; but, on the same trial, this unit might become inactive and another unit (e.g., ax) might become active through X's (unconditioned) influence on this hidden layer unit. Activity in ax would then be coincident with activity in the (opposing) no-food unit that becomes active when food is not presented on an AX trial. This scenario would allow X (and A) to become linked to ax, and for ax to become linked to the no-food output unit. These changes would allow the presentation of X, in particular, to activate the no-food output unit.
In conclusion, the results of Experiments 1-3 indicate that during compound conditioning the representations acquired during conditional learning change in their capacity to provoke conditioned responding in a similar fashion to the representations of CSs from simple Pavlovian learning (Rescorla, 2000) . One general implication of this similarity is that we should take seriously the suggestion that a common explanatory framework should be sought for both forms of learning. This is not a novel suggestion.
